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ABSTRACT: Most OECD countries support the arts with a broad range of 
tax incentives.  The primary incentives provided in New Zealand are direct 
subsidies to traditional art forms, such as the ballet and the symphony 
orchestra; tax credits for donations to certain not-for-profit organisations, 
which may include arts organisations; and tax incentives for New Zealand 
production of films, digital and visual effects.    
This paper investigates the economic, philosophical and sociological 
arguments raised for and against the provision of tax incentives for ‘the arts’.  
A variety of direct and indirect instruments are discussed.  A trans-Tasman 
comparison of arts related funding and incentives is undertaken and the 
suggestion made that New Zealand must engage in more effective targeting of 
scarce resources in order to maximise outcomes from tax incentives and 




Countries throughout the OECD provide tax based support for the arts.  This 
support may take the form of tax credits, tax deductions for charitable donations, 
grants or targeted supported.  Incentives are provided to a range of industries that 
include, but are not limited to, the performing arts, film, publishing, music, digital 
media, literature and television.   
Typically, government support of the arts is justified with the assumption that the 
market for the arts does not work, or that the arts generate a social benefit that 
validates state support.  There are a number of issues in quantifying and justifying 
state support for the arts.  Of particular relevance are the definitional issues around 
what qualifies as ‘art’; the difficulties associated with measuring the potential 
economic contribution, if any, from the arts; and measuring the level of assistance 
provided to the arts community, particularly in relation to indirect assistance.  As 
observed by Frey (1999:75): 
creativity is an elusive concept and most difficult to deal with in a way 
providing useful insights for the typical problems with which the 
economics of art is concerned.  In particular, the effect of government 
intervention on artistic activity is complex, and does not lend itself to 
simple relationships and conclusions.   
In the current environment of constrained resources, it would appear timely to 
revisit the issue of tax incentives for the arts and ask the questions of who receives tax 
incentives, how much they get, who decides on the allocation, and the economic 
benefits gained from the subsidies provided.  This paper explores the justification for 
tax incentives for the arts and offers some suggestions for their existence.  In addition, 
it investigates the philosophical issues raised in providing tax incentives for the arts, 
including what qualifies as an ‘art’.   
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The paper commences with a discussion on what is art.  An outline of the 
literature follows, incorporating the economic, philosophical and sociological 
arguments for the provision of tax incentives for the arts.  The different forms of 
incentives, and advantages and disadvantages of the incentives are summarised.  The 
current direct and indirect funding approaches in New Zealand and Australia are 
examined, followed by a discussion on the debates around the provision of incentives 
for arts activities.  Conclusions are drawn in the final section.    
 
WHAT IS ART? 
When exploring a topic such as this, perhaps the first issue to address is the 
question of ‘what is art’?  Arts are ‘experience goods’ providing economic value that 
is difficult to measure.  Typically arts are performance based and perishable2  by 
nature.  Definitions of art range from the product of human creativity, to the popular 
Wikipedia definition: ‘the process or product of deliberately arranging elements in a 
way that appeals to the senses or emotions’.   
For the purposes of this paper, art is not confined to the traditional ‘high arts’.  
While the more conventional performing arts (e.g. ballet, opera, and orchestral 
performances) are considered, other, more modern arts, such as digital film 
production, are included in the discussion.  Items that are cultural in nature and 
traditionally supported by the state, such as the provision of a national archive, 
national library or a national museum are excluded from this discussion.  Cultural 
activities tend to be broader in definition than the arts, including heritage items as 
well as more traditional forms of performing arts (Ginsburgh and Throsby 2006:5).  
The primary reason for exclusion of cultural activities in this analysis is that 
arguments surrounding justification of funding for culturally significant activities 
differ considerably from the debates around activities of a more conventional artistic 
nature.3  Instead, the focus is on those activities that have greater discretion for a 
country, are more likely to be supported by a small proportion of the population and 
less likely to have cultural significance.   
From a broader perspective, art may be included within the category of ‘creative 
industry’; a topic that has generated considerable research interest in recent times.  A 
creative industry is defined by Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright (2008:5) as 
essentially dualistic, comprising an intangible and a tangible component and 
‘underpinned by intangible creativity and ideas (symbolic cultural expressions, 
musical ideas, visual images, products of the intellect) as well as a tangible mode of 
delivery’.  For the purposes of completeness, creative industries are also included in 
this analysis.   
Among the statements defending state support for the arts, are those such as the 
following: ‘art is beyond calculation, and due to its uniqueness it may not be 
compared with anything else’ (Frey and Pommerehne 1989:8); ‘we have an interest in 
promoting beauty and excellence, which it is reasonable for us to fulfil in part 
through government activity’ (Brighouse 1995:35); and ‘the arts are among the most 
desirable products of civilization – they are among the most worthy of the outputs of 
the economy’ (Baumol 2003:21).  However, despite this apparent worthiness, in many 
cases there is a gap between supply and demand of arts activities, which results in the 
                                                
2 That is, they cannot be stored.   
3 For example, individuals have different perspectives on the funding of cultural activities and the 
funding of more traditional art forms.  In addition, cultural goods and services are more likely to adhere 
to the ‘public good’ definition that is used to support government funding, whereas more conventional 
arts do not easily fit within this boundary.   
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need for financial support from other sources, such as the state.  Thus, it would appear 
that some consideration of their net contribution to society is warranted.     
 
TAX AND THE ARTS 
Tax incentives are typically provided to encourage or modify certain behaviours.  
These behaviours may be macro- or micro-economic in nature: for example, they may 
be provided to individuals to encourage saving for retirement, or they may be 
provided to large organisations to assist in maintaining competitiveness in a global 
environment.  Typically, there is some economic benefit associated with their 
provision. 
The behavioural effects resulting from tax incentives are well known, and 
include: 
? increasing the attractiveness of the concessionally taxed activity; 
? the need for increased tax revenue from other sources to supplement for 
revenue foregone; 
? the possible impact on economic activity, with the altered allocation of scarce 
resources (Commonwealth of Australia 2009:23).   
Economics and art are a relatively recent addition to the academic literature, with 
the origin of the discipline now known as contemporary cultural economics in the mid 
1960s, following the seminal research of Baumol and Bowen (1966).  Despite its 
recent addition to the academic community, tax incentives for the arts are not new; 
they have existed in some countries from the early 20th century (Weil 1991:168).    
A variety of economic and philosophical viewpoints have been raised for, and 
against, state involvement in funding the arts.  The reasons outlined below from 
Towse (1997) and Throsby and Withers (1979), are used as a framework for 
investigation of the common arguments for government assistance to the arts.   
Towse (1997:256) suggests that there are four primary benefits that flow from the 
arts to society, which provide an argument for state support: 
? The national prestige or identity that may result from the existence of the art; 
? The economic spill over from the existence of the art (such as increased 
tourism); 
? The creation of a legacy for future generations; and 
? Their educational contribution.   
In addition to the points made by Towse (1997), Throsby and Withers (1979:170) 
add the following: 
? Support for the arts ‘provides work for artists in their chosen profession, 
prevents loss of talent to other professions or to other countries and also 
attracts key non-artistic personnel to the country who require a cultured 
environment’; 
? The option value associated with the arts that is held by individuals that do not 
attend arts performances;  
? The high risks and uncertainties of artistic activity; 
? The range of community benefits generated by the existence of the 
performing arts, as well as for those who do not attend the performances, 
including ‘the provision of public creative ideas and aesthetic standards; the 
development of national feeling, pride and identity; the provision of social 
comment and criticism; and the social improvement of the participants in the 
arts’.  
Each of the points raised by Towse (1997), and Throsby and Withers (1979), is 
discussed in more detail in this section.   
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National Identity and National Prestige 
As observed by O’Hagan (1998:23), ‘one of the arguments used most frequently 
in relation to subsidies to the arts relates to national identity’.  Throsby and Withers 
(1979:177) define ‘national identity’ as ‘those elements of national life which 
characterise a country and distinguish its attitudes, institutions, behaviour and way of 
life from those of other countries’. Furthermore, the argument is made that the 
existence of arts institutions leads to an enhanced concept of society, which leads to 
greater social cohesion (Globerman 1987:30).     
While claims such as ‘screen productions are particularly significant for their 
impact on how New Zealanders see themselves’ 4  may be found, more often, the 
national identity arguments as support for the arts are viewed as‘very dubious grounds 
on which to base a public subsidy argument’ (O’Hagan 1998:25).    
 
Externalities 
A primary argument for state support for the arts is that they provide externalities 
or spill over benefits.  An externality exists when the benefits (or costs) of a good or 
service have a spill over effect to those not involved in the transaction.  In relation to 
the arts, positive externalities may exist for society in both production and 
consumption.  For example, individuals travelling to experience an arts performance 
will potentially consume other goods and services, such as accommodation, meals and 
transport.  This expenditure assists in job creation in a variety of industries in the 
location of the art provided.  Thus, the economic argument is that if ‘benefits exist to 
non-consumers as well as to consumers, society as a whole should be willing to pay 
more for a product than would the direct consumers of that product’ (Globerman 
1987:16).  However, it is also argued that most economic activities create some form 
of externality, thus the existence of an externality in isolation is insufficient grounds 
to justify financial support from the state.   
 
Legacy for Future Generations / Option Value 
Towse (1997) suggests the creation of a legacy for future generations as 
justification for state support.  This is perhaps more frequently recognised in the 
literature as the option value associated with the arts, as suggested by Throsby and 
Withers (1979).  The literature suggests that some individuals who do not attend the 
performing arts, nonetheless, attach a value to their existence.  For example, Throsby 
(1994:23) observes that: 
the arts are socially beneficial when held by people who do not themselves 
consume the arts directly, or an acceptance by some individuals of the 
desirability of others’ consumption, can be accounted for in this way.  In 
such cases what appears at first sight to be “imposed choice” turns out to 
be ultimately consistent with the principle of consumer sovereignty.    
In the economic literature this has been explored as the ‘willingness-to-pay’ 
approach, which examines the value of a particular art to the population.  Bille 
Hansen (1997) finds that in a situation of payment for the Royal Theatre in 
Copenhagen, the population was willing to pay an amount at least equal to the 
government subsidy.  While visitor numbers to the theatre were around seven per cent 
of the total population, willingness to pay by non-users was also substantial.  This 
effect is described by Throsby and Withers (1979) as an option value on the presence 
                                                
4 Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2004, Review of Government Screen Funding Arrangements, 
Discussion Paper, http://www.mch.govt.nz.  
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of the arts for non-users.  The option value is not reflected in the market, as no 
demand is exerted (Frey and Pommerehne 1989:10).  The value exists from the 
opportunity to attend performances, despite non-attendance in practice, together with 
a value that they can be utilised by others.  The option value argument, to some 
extent, addresses the question of why it is that if benefit is generated by arts, that 
those obtaining that direct benefit may not incur the full costs of it.  Thus, state 
support may be warranted to allow this option demand to be met.   
 
Education 
The educational potential from the arts may flow to both the producer and the 
consumer.  Existence of arts organisations provides employment and skill 
enhancement opportunities for those engaged in all elements of the production.  
Similarly, it is argued those attending the arts also benefit from a component of 
learning from the experience.  However, traditional forms of art are often charged 
with being the domain of the elite.  While this is outside the scope of this paper, there 
is considerable support among the literature linking factors such as income and 
education to ‘high arts’ attendance.  As observed by Baumol (2003:21), ‘the 
difficulties of those who advocate public support for the arts is compounded by the 
well documented fact that their audience is typically composed of individuals whose 
incomes, wealth and education are well above those of the population as a whole’.5  
The association between attendance at arts performances, higher levels of 
education and higher consumer income is well established (e.g. Throsby 1994:8;    
Ginsburgh and Throsby 2006:8; Schuster 2006:1275).  Blaug (2001:125) captures this 
point succinctly, stating ‘that audiences for the arts are skewed to the right in income, 
age, occupation, and levels of education and indeed differ more markedly in years of 
schooling achieved than in any other personal characteristic’.  Thus, the argument in 
support of increased education may be valid as a spill over benefit, but, as with all the 
arguments supporting state support, is tempered by the over-utilisation of some arts 
activities by the wealthier, more educated proportion of society.   
  
Arts and Economic Growth 
In recent years, there has been considerable attention paid to the links between 
arts based industries and economic growth.  This economic growth can be viewed as 
an externality from state support for the arts industries.  There is some indication that 
the arts, as an industry, is growing at a faster pace than average and providing a 
greater contribution to society than many other industries.  The United Kingdom 
publishes an annual Creative Industries Economic Estimates,6 outlining estimates of 
economic contribution provided by the creative industries.7  As at January 2009, the 
gross value added by creative industries was estimated at 6.4 per cent.  In addition, 
creative industries in the United Kingdom are demonstrating higher growth than the 
wider economy (at 4 per cent over the ten years from 1997 to 2006 compared to three 
per cent for the economy as a whole). 
                                                
5 An example of this is provided by Towse (2003:342) who notes that in the United Kingdom, opera 
receives five times the amount of subsidy per attendance when compared to other Arts Council 
supported performing arts organisations, despite only being attended by seven per cent of the 
population.   
6 Available at: http://www.culture.gov.uk.  
7 The estimates include the following industries: advertising; architecture; art and antiques; designer 
fashion; video, film and photography; music and the visual and performing arts; publishing; software, 
computer games and electronic publishing; and radio and television.   
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Peacock (2006:1134) observes that state support for the arts can provide a spill 
over benefit to other producer organisations.  This is similar to Florida’s (2002, 2005) 
argument of the existence of a ‘creative class’.  Florida’s primary argument is that the 
presence of ‘creative’ individuals among a population can result in improved 
economic growth.  Florida calls these people the ‘creative class’ (2005:34), explaining 
‘the distinguishing characteristic of the Creative Class is that its members engage in 
work whose function is to create meaningful new forms’. Florida suggests that 
approximately 30 per cent of the United States population may qualify as comprising 
part of the creative class.8  
Florida’s research shows that ‘places that succeed in attracting and retaining 
creative class people prosper; those that fail don’t’ (Florida 2002:4).  This may 
perhaps be viewed as a multiplier effect: where initial spending (i.e. state funding) 
results in increased consumption (i.e. spending), which results in increased national 
income.  The question that is difficult to answer is whether the consumption would 
have existed in the absence of the state funding; in other words is there a causal 
relationship between state funding and increased national income.   
Florida suggests that centres that are benefiting from the presence of a creative 
class are not doing so because of the traditional infrastructure support arguments that 
are attributed to the choice of business location, or from the existence of significant 
tax incentives.  Instead, he suggests that these centres are proving successful as 
creative individuals want to live there, and organisations follow the people (or may be 
started by them) (Florida 2005:35).   
Florida is not the first to highlight the potential economic benefits from a thriving 
arts community.  Throsby (1994:25) observes that ‘the arts can be seen as a 
potentially leading sector in central city renewal and in urban economic 
development’ and Globerman (1987:21) notes that ‘government intervention and 
support in the culture area has been increasingly justified on the basis that culture is 
“big business” that makes an important economic contribution to the entire 
community’.  Thus, the argument of state funding support that may result in increased 
economic growth has some merit.  However, the arts need to demonstrate that the 
funding assists in achieving this outcome.   
 
Risk, Uncertainty and Market Failure 
The argument described by Throsby and Withers (1979) as the risk and 
uncertainty of artistic activity, is perhaps more readily recognised as the potential for 
market failure.  Market failure is a common argument raised in support of state 
assistance to the arts and is the condition where ‘the market is “incapable” of 
producing the “socially efficient” output rate for a particular product’ (Globerman 
1987:13).  The position is captured by Towse (1997:256) who suggests that: 
failure to pass the market test does not necessarily mean that the goods in 
question are unwanted; it merely reflects the fact that they are not 
amendable to ordinary commercial standards of valuation.  In these 
conditions public support may be entirely justified as the only available 
means to make demand effective.  
                                                
8 Florida defines a ‘creative class’ as ‘a fast growing, highly educated, and well-paid segment of the 
workforce on whose efforts corporate profits and economic growth increasingly depend.  Members of 
the creative class do a wide variety of work in a wide variety of industries – from technology to 
entertainment, journalism to finance, high-end manufacturing to the arts. They do not consciously think 
of themselves as a class.  Yet they share a common ethos that values creativity, individuality, 
difference, and merit’ (Florida 2002:3).   
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The market failure argument appears warranted for many arts based activities.  
However, it is not applicable for all arts.  As observed by Frey and Pommerehne 
(1989:16), markets for the arts may work effectively.  Frey and Pommerehne use the 
example of fine art to demonstrate this principle, noting that works by Lichtenstein 
and Warhol were commercially recognised and traded at high prices long before 
museums of modern art considered them suitable for display.  This raises the question 
of whether the market for arts does not work effectively, or whether it has not been 
appropriately tested.   
 
Community Benefits and the Merit Good Argument 
Throsby and Withers (1979) suggest that society benefits from the provision of 
the arts.  This is aligned with the economic perspective of the arts as a merit good.  A 
merit good is one that, ideally, is maximised as it is deemed to be socially desirable.  
Education and health services can be examples of merit goods: where they are 
provided on the basis of need, rather than ability to pay.   
Netzer (1978:16) suggests that: 
the meritorious nature of the arts is the most general and perhaps the most 
widely espoused argument for public subsidy.  It is a valid point of view 
but an inadequate guide for public policy; it tells us nothing except that 
more of what is good is better.  It does not, for example, help fund-
granting agencies to decide which activities and organizations are most 
deserving of additional subsidy.   
Thus, merit, may be one deciding factor in where funding is distributed but, in 
isolation, the merit good argument is insufficient for funding allocation decision-
making in an environment of scarce resources.   
 
Summary 
What may be seen from the perspectives outlined in this section is that a number 
of arguments exist for why the state should provide support for the arts.  However, the 
issue is not assisted by the complexity of demand and supply associated with the arts, 
combined with the elements of private goods providing public externalities.  Perhaps 
the issue is best captured by Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright (2008:3) who suggest 
that creative enterprises ‘come with high risk, uncertainty, transaction costs, network 
externalities, spillovers and public good effects that imply that markets alone will not 
be sufficient to create an adequate resource base’.    
 
FORMS OF TAX INCENTIVES 
Throughout the OECD, various forms of tax support for the arts exist, including 
exemptions from capital gains, estate or gift taxes; deductions for individual and 
company donations to art organisations; grants or subsidies; state provided support for 
arts based education and training; and a variety of additional tax exemptions for arts 
institutions.9  A further way of subsiding the arts through the tax system is through 
reduced Value Added Taxes, such as those provided in the Netherlands.10   Additional 
state support mechanisms are suggested by Schuster (1986:320): ‘tax policies, 
copyright laws, zoning, unemployment and employment programs, urban 
                                                
9 It is acknowledged that support may also be regulatory in nature, such as the requirement in New 
Zealand for locally generated programming to be broadcast for at least one-third of the hours between 
6.00am and 10.00pm, in order to qualify for a Local FM Radio Broadcasting Licence.   
10 Value Added Tax incentives are the principal form of tax incentives for the arts in the Netherlands 
(Hemels 2006:2).   
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redevelopment programs, and social security legislation are among the ways that 
governments can affect the flow of money to the arts and the mix of artistic activities 
ultimately available to the public’.  This sentiment is not challenged, but the 
limitations associated with measuring the components of these various expenditures 
that may have an impact on the arts, will be evident.  Thus, the research limits itself to 
those subsidies that can be clearly linked to arts activities: both direct and indirect tax 
incentives.   
Subsidies reduce the ability of the market to provide an optimal price and quantity 
from the traditional supply and demand mechanism.  However, as found by Schuster 
(2006:1286), ‘many countries are experimenting with a wide variety of tax-based 
incentives that go well beyond the realm of private individual or corporate 
philanthropy’.   
Historically, the provision of direct grants, which may be either public or private 
in nature, has been one of the most common methods of providing financial assistance 
to the arts (Throsby and Withers 1979:230).  In addition to direct subsidies, 
governments frequently encourage taxpayer contributions to arts institutions, for 
example, through tax rebates.  Research by Eckel and Grossman (2006:794) 
investigates two possible ways of subsidising donations to charities: rebates and 
government matching contributions.  In a laboratory experiment, Eckel and Grossman 
find individuals give more under a matching system than under a tax deduction rebate 
system.  
Another form of indirect subsidy is a tax deduction for contributions to the arts 
(more commonly framed as a tax deduction to a not-for-profit organisation).  This 
deduction effectively makes the government a co-contributor to the donor 
organisation, reducing the donor’s tax obligation and increasing the state liability.  In 
countries that provide tax deductions for private contributions to arts organisations, 
Brooks (2004:89) suggests that this provides a significantly larger contribution than 
direct government subsidies.  Brooks suggests that in the United States, around $14 in 
indirect contributions is made for every $1 in direct subsidy.11      
Another issue with tax deductions for any activity is their relative decline in 
recent years as marginal tax rates have reduced.  This general decline in marginal tax 
rates has seen the balance of the contribution move from the state to the taxpayer.  
Thus, a donor wanting to make a contribution at a certain level will see the 
government co-contribution reduce.  Thus, as observed by Weil (1991:169), ‘in theory 
at least … the value of the charitable deduction as in incentive for private giving has 
been substantially eroded simply by the ongoing reduction in the maximum marginal 
tax rate’.   
An alternative approach is that of a tax credit, which reduces the donor’s tax 
obligation by a proportion of the amount of the donation.  The advantage of this 
approach is that the contributions made by the donor and the state do not have a 
relationship to the income of the donor.  Feld, O’Hare and Schuster (1983:217) note 
that a shift from tax deductions to tax credits, with the size of government tax 
expenditure unchanging, lowers the tax cost of giving for lower income individuals 
and increases it for higher income individuals.  Thus, a shift to a tax credit system 
could be justified on improved equity grounds.  However, as captured by Throsby and 
Withers (1979:240): 
                                                
11 This may be compared to the Royal New Zealand Ballet, which received NZ$3.5 million in state 
support (in the 2008/09 financial year), additional revenues of NZ$2.5 million from other grants and 
sponsorship, and NZ$2.7 million from all other income; indicating around 40 per cent of revenue was 
in the form of a direct state subsidy.   
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since the rates struck under a tax credit system would probably be such as 
to reduce the financial incentive to rich donors as compared to a system 
involving deductibility of donations, and since this group is likely to be the 
major source of private finance, the overall flow of private funds to the 
performing arts could be expected to be lower under the more “equitable” 
tax credit arrangement than with a more discriminating scheme.    
Furthermore, as noted by Weil (1991:173): 
the charitable deduction reduces the amount of income that is to be taxed 
rather than the tax that is to be paid, and because the progressive rate 
structure of the federal tax system … makes such a deduction more 
valuable to a high-income taxpayer than to one in a lower bracket, these 
critics argue that the incentive offered for individual giving to 
organizations should at least be in the form of a credit against tax rather 
than as a deduction from income.  As such, it would provide the same 
dollar benefit to every taxpayer, regardless of his or her tax bracket.   
From the perspective of an individual, a tax incentive decreases the marginal cost 
of making a donation to an arts organisation.  A question that has been explored in the 
literature is whether the existence of such an incentive increases the amount that is 
donated, as the cost of giving reduces, i.e. the price elasticity of giving.  The literature 
is undecided on this effect.  Early research found a price elasticity of giving greater 
than one (i.e. the organisation receiving the donation receives more than the 
government reduction in tax revenue) (Schuster 2006:1273).  However, more recent 
research has challenged this finding and indicates that donors will take advantage of 
the tax expenditure to reduce the private contribution (Schuster 2006:1274).   
 
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 
This section outlines the tax incentives provided in New Zealand and Australia 
for the arts.  New Zealand funding includes sources from both national and local 
government, while Australian funding is obtained from both the national and the state 
government.   
 
New Zealand 
In 1963, the establishment of the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council, resulted in the 
provision of a number of objectives for the Arts Council; these are outlined below: 
(a) ‘to encourage, foster and promote the practice and appreciation of the 
arts in New Zealand; 
(b) to make accessible to the public of New Zealand all forms of artistic or 
cultural work; 
(c) to improve standards of execution of the arts; 
(d) to foster and maintain public interest in the arts and culture in New 
Zealand; …’ (Throsby and Withers 1979:209).  
The aim of providing funding at the present time is outlined in the appropriations 
for the Vote Arts, Culture and Heritage and is to: ‘…help ensure that culture is visible 
and accessible, and deliver cultural products and services to New Zealanders and 
international audiences’.  The focus on culture, rather than arts, is apparent in this 
statement.   
New Zealand’s current position on funding for the arts is perhaps best seen from a 
recent announcement by Chris Finlayson, New Zealand Minister for Arts, Culture and 
Heritage, that the government intends to investigate overseas funding models to 
encourage a ‘culture of philanthropy’ in New Zealand, with the arts as a focus.  A 
taskforce ‘consisting of several of New Zealand’s most high-profile supporters of the 
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arts’ will investigate ways to improve charitable giving in New Zealand. 12   Mr 
Finlayson commented that the state has an ongoing responsibility for funding the arts.  
However, for many years in New Zealand, there have been few generous tax 
incentives for this endeavour, with the exception of the film industry.    
The film industry has benefited from government support in recent years, with the 
provision of a tax exempt ‘Large Budget Screen Production Grant’ for New Zealand 
based production of films, digital, and visual effects.  The objective of this grant is to 
increase economic growth by providing a financial incentive to attract large budget 
film and television productions to New Zealand.  In addition, the grant has a 
secondary objective to accelerate skill development and technology transfer within the 
local screen production industry and to provide additional benefits for the economy 
via increased tourism and the promotion of New Zealand.13   
The value of the Large Budget Screen Production Grant is 15 per cent of 
qualifying production expenditures.  The grant applies to screen productions in 
various formats (including feature films and television drama series).  For these 
formats ‘qualifying New Zealand production expenditure’14 must be NZ$15 million.  
The grant is also available for post, digital and visual effects, in which case the 
qualifying New Zealand production expenditure may be between NZ$3 million and 
NZ$15 million.  The grant is available to New Zealand resident companies or foreign 
organisations operating with a fixed establishment in New Zealand for the purposes of 
lodging an income tax return.  Audited information must be presented to the Inland 
Revenue Department for verification prior to grant payment.   
Another key incentive is the Screen Production Incentive Fund (SPIF), introduced 
in 2008.  The SPIF provides a grant of 40 per cent of New Zealand qualifying 
production expenditure for New Zealand feature films and 20 per cent for television 
and other screen production expenditure.  Funds allocated for this endeavour were 
NZ$27.8 million over four years15 plus a further NZ$26 million from existing funding 
to the New Zealand Film Commission (NZ$53.8 million in total).16  To qualify for 
these funds, the productions are required to have significant New Zealand content17 
and meet an eligibility threshold (e.g. NZ$5 million for feature films; NZ$250,000 per 
hour of documentary production).  The upper limit is NZ$15 million for any 
individual production, resulting in a maximum grant of NZ$6 million (at 40 per cent) 
to any one project.   
                                                
12  Review to Improve Arts Philanthropy, Press Release, 30 September 2009, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz.  
13 Office of the Minister for Economic Development, Cabinet Policy Committee Business Committee, 
Large Budget Screen Production Grant Review of Bundling, Cabinet Paper, July 2007.   
14 This is: ‘the production expenditure incurred for, or attributable to: goods and services provided in 
New Zealand; the use of land located in New Zealand; and the use of a good that is located in New 
Zealand at the time that good is used in the making of the screen production’. Film New Zealand, 
Production Guide, http://www.filmnz.com/production-guide.     
15 That is, NZ$3 million in the 2008/09 year, and NZ$8.250 million in each of the following four years. 
16 Ministry for Culture and Heritage.  Available at http://www.mch.govt.nz.   
17 A ‘New Zealand Content Test’ exists for this purpose, which has been designed to ‘reflect the 
importance of on-screen New Zealand content – in terms of New Zealand characters, locations, stories, 
and historical and cultural elements’.  However, the criteria also state that it is possible for a 
production to meet the content test ‘while having no identifiable New Zealand setting, characters or 
other cultural elements.  It is not the intention of the Test to restrict New Zealand film-makers’ 
creativity by limiting them solely to New Zealand settings and situations’.  Thus, high levels of New 
Zealand production activity could also assist in meeting the test.   Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 
New Zealand Screen Production Incentive Fund, http://www.mch.govt.nz/publications/screen-
production-fund.    
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In New Zealand, government funding is provided to a number of sectors that fall 
within the broad definition of the arts.  The government department that receives this 
funding is the Ministry of Arts, Culture and Heritage.  Funding is provided in the 
following categories:18 
? Music Industry Commission 
? New Zealand Film Archive 
? New Zealand Symphony Orchestra 
? Royal New Zealand Ballet 
? Film Production Fund 
? Christchurch Art Gallery 
? Te Papa Tongarewa  
? New Zealand Music Commission 
? Arts Council of New Zealand 
? Creative New Zealand19 
Expenditure in the 2009/10 budget (along with the previous year actual spend) is 
outlined in Table 1: 
 








Per cent of 
Annual 
Income 
Museum Services 24,644 24,644 50%
Performing Arts Services      
New Zealand Symphony Orchestra 13,446 13,446 78%
Royal New Zealand Ballet 3,534 4,384 42%
New Zealand Music Commission 1,378 1,378 88%
Te Matatini21 1,248 1,248 80%
Promotion and Support of the Arts 
and Film 
 
Creative New Zealand 15,937 15,689 45%
New Zealand Film Commission 3,611 3,611 22%
 
These figures exclude capital expenditure.  For example, Te Papa Tongarewa (the 
National Museum) is allocated NZ$9 million per annum for ongoing capital 
expenditure, exhibition research and development, and acquisition of items for the 
collection.  In relation to economic factors, the primary output performance measures 




                                                
18 A number of categories of funding (e.g. management of historic places, public broadcasting (New 
Zealand on Air, TVNZ, Radio New Zealand International, Broadcasting Standards Authority)) have 
been excluded from discussion in this paper.   
19 This is the Arts Council of New Zealand.  It is responsible for schemes such as the Creative 
Communities Scheme, which aims to increase participation in the arts at a local level, and increase the 
range and diversity of arts available to communities.  http://www.creativenz.govt.nz.  
20  Vote Arts, Culture and Heritage. The Estimates of Appropriations 2009/10, B.5.  Available at 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz.   
21 The national body for Maori Performing Arts for Aotearoa.   
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Table 2: Primary Performance Measures in New Zealand 
 
Museum Services Visitor numbers, new exhibitions 
Performing Arts Services Audiences, performances,  
Promotion and Support of 
the Arts and Film 
Arts development, access to arts experiences, 
projects funded, films financed 
 
In addition to central government funding, in many New Zealand regions arts 
funding is supported by local government.  For example, in Wellington (a city which 
considers itself to be the cultural capital of New Zealand), the Wellington City Annual 
Report discloses expenditure on the arts under the category of ‘Cultural Wellbeing’, 
as outlined in Table 3:22  
 
Table 3: Expenditure on Cultural Wellbeing in Wellington (2008-09) 
 




Arts partnerships $2,620 $13.61 
Community arts and cultural support $3,741 $19.43 
Galleries and museums $6,376 $33.12 
Heritage $1,226 $6.37 
Total Cultural Wellbeing $13,963 $72.53 
 
By way of comparison, expenditure on other environmental items that are 
typically considered as important to New Zealanders are outlined in Table 4: 
 
Table 4: Selected Environmental Expenditure in Wellington (2008-09) 
 




Environmental conservation attractions $4,260 $22.13 
Gardens and beaches $12,075 $62.73 
Green open spaces $14,014 $72.80 
Total Selected Environmental Expenditure $30,349 $157.66  
 
Total expenditure (excluding finance expenses) for the Wellington City Council 
in the 2008-09 financial year was NZ$331 million, indicating that 4.2 per cent of 
expenditure was related to ‘cultural wellbeing’.  On the selected environmental issues, 
expenditure was 9.1 per cent.   
In 2007, the previous maximum limit on the tax rebate available for donations 
made by individuals was removed.  The tax rebate became a tax credit claimable at 
the value of one-third of the gifted amount.  In addition, maximum deduction limits 
for corporate donations were also removed.  These tax concessions are available for 
donations made to ‘registered charities’.  To meet the requirements under the 
Charities Act 2005, a registered charity must have a charitable purpose; broadly 
providing services of benefit to the community.  A number of arts organisations, 
including the Royal New Zealand Ballet, are listed as registered charities by the 
Charities Commission.   
                                                




The equivalent portfolio to New Zealand’s Ministry of Culture and Heritage is the 
Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts.  Under 
‘arts’ portfolios, funding allocations are: 
? The Australia Council23 - A$181.9M 
? Australian Film, Television and Radio School - A$23.7M 
? Australian National Maritime Museum – A$23.2M 
? National Film and Sound Archives – A$25.2M 
? National Gallery of Australia – A$69.9M 
? National Library of Australia – A$69.8M 
? National Museum of Australia – A$46.2M 
? Screen Australia – A$102.1M 
Of further, and perhaps greater, relevance is the Tax Expenditures Statement.  
The most recent of these is the Tax Expenditures Statement 2008 (TES).  The TES 
‘provides details of concessions, benefits, incentives and charges provided through 
the tax system…to taxpayers by the Australian Government’.24  There are 320 tax 
expenditures in the 2008 statement.  A tax expenditure is ‘a tax concession that 
provides a benefit to a specified activity or class of taxpayer’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2009:6).  These tax expenditures may be in the form of a tax deduction, tax 
offset, tax exemption, or a concessional tax rate.  The tax expenditure statement 
provides an outline of the financial revenue foregone due to the provision of the tax 
benefit.  As noted in the Tax Expenditure Statement 2008: ‘tax expenditures are often 
an alternative to direct expenditures as a method of delivering government assistance 
or meeting government objectives’ Commonwealth of Australia (2009:6).   
Superannuation tax concessions are one of the key components of the tax 
expenditures in Australia, attracting A$24,550 million in the 2009/10 tax expenditure 
forecast.25  Recreation and culture receive A$232 million in the 2008/09 financial 
year, projected to increase to A$240 million for 2009/10.  The primary tax 
concessions provided for the arts at the Commonwealth level are: 
? The exemption of certain prizes (e.g. literary awards) from taxation; 
? Income averaging for certain occupations, including authors, inventors, 
performing artists and production associates; 
? Film Tax Offset payments (where film production companies incur expenses 
in relation to Australian productions, they may be eligible for tax offsets, 
including a location offset, a producer offset, and a post, digital and visual 
effects offset).  These tax offsets are typically a 15 per cent rebate; 
? An exemption from income tax for the Australian Film Finance Corporation; 
? Tax incentives for film investment (this is accelerated depreciation of capital 
expenditure incurred in purchasing an interest in the copyright of a new 
Australian film).  The write-off may be either fully deducted in the year of 
acquisition or over two years.  This is valid up until July 2010; and 
                                                
23 The Australia Council is responsible for ‘creation, presentation and appreciation of distinctive 
cultural works by providing assistance to Australian artists and making their works accessible to the 
public’ Budget: Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-2010, Budget Related Paper No 1.6 Environment, 
Water, Heritage and The Arts Portfolio, p.13.  
24 Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, Tax Expenditures Statement 2008. http://www.treasury.gov.au.   
25 This figure is costs less offsets.  The Treasury, 2008, Tax Expenditure Statement 2008, Appendix B, 
Aggregated Superannuation Tax Expenditure, p.210.  
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? Capital gains tax exemption for assets disposed of under the Cultural Gifts 
program.26 
Similarly to New Zealand’s Charities Register, Australia also operates a Register 
of Cultural Organisations.  Donors contributing to organisations on this register will 
attract a tax deduction for their donation.  The purpose of the scheme is to strengthen 
public support for the arts.27  A number of conventional arts organisations are on the 
register, including state ballet companies and the Australian Ballet.   
In addition, Screen Australia, provides direct funding for the film and television 
industry.28  For example, an Enterprise Program provides funding up to A$500,000 
per year for three years to support film production companies to develop their 
businesses. In addition, single-project development programs exist for individual 
projects of value up to A$50,000.  Targeted ‘Talent Escalator Programs’ exist to 
support skill development, expansion of market knowledge and production expertise, 
with funding up to A$20,000.  Furthermore an Innovation Program, funds up to 
A$30,000 for digital media development purposes and A$250,000 for production. 
In Australia, over the period from 1994/95 to 2007/08 more than three-quarters of 
film agency income was from the government.  Over this period, A$1.85 billion in 
appropriations was provided to federal film agencies and A$481 million to the state 
film agencies.29  Funding is also provided through the Australia Council for the Arts.  
This organisation provides contestable funding of around A$160 million per annum to 
arts organisations and individuals per annum.   
Funding to the arts is also provided by the States.  For the purposes of 
comparison, the state of New South Wales is used for analysis.  The New South 
Wales Government provides support for the arts through Arts New South Wales.  As 
well as fellowships, scholarships and awards, it also provides direct funding.  The 
funding is provided with the aim of increasing access to the arts and cultural activities 
across New South Wales.  In addition, the New South Wales Film and Television 
Office provides financial and other forms of assistance to the film and television 
industry.   
Adopting the state of New South Wales for comparison purposes permits 
inclusion of a unique Australian icon in this discussion: the Sydney Opera House.  In 
2009, the Sydney Opera House received A$14.4 million in the form of a government 
endowment, together with A$30.4 million in the form of a maintenance grant.  
Operating revenues from the sale of goods and services were A$50 million, with an 
overall reported loss of A$8.7 million.  The operating revenue and expenses provided 
in the financial statements for the organisation indicate that under the current 




                                                
26 The Taxation Incentives for the Arts Scheme commenced operation in 1978.  The purpose of the 
scheme was to encourage donations of gifts in kind to cultural institutions in Australia.  Today, an 
indirect tax incentive remains under this scheme (now the Cultural Gifts Programme), providing for a 
tax deduction and capital gains tax exemption for a gift of property that has cultural significance to a 
public art gallery, museum, library or archive.    
27  Australian Government, Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 
http://www.arts.gov.au.   
28  Screen Australia commenced in 2008 and brings together the functions of the Australian Film 
Commission, the Film Finance Corporation Australia and Film Australia Limited.  Screen Australia is 
also responsible for the aforementioned Producer Offset.   
29 Screen Australia, http://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/gtp/govtfundsummary.html.  
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DISCUSSION 
The primary question raised from the above discussion is whether government 
contributions to the arts are justified, either from an economic or a social perspective.  
If the answer to this question is yes, then subsequent questions of which arts are 
funded and the form of this funding need addressing.    
The fundamental economic argument is that we exist in a world of scarce 
resources and, accordingly, choices must be made in relation to how these resources 
are allocated.  In an environment of limited resources, it would appear reasonable to 
suggest that funds are allocated to where they will provide the greatest return, or at the 
very least, an established return, either from a demonstrated social or positive 
economic benefit.  Some of the issues discussed earlier are revisited in this section, 
together with some additional issues raised from the previous section on arts funding 
in New Zealand and Australia.   
 
National Identity 
While the national identity argument may have validity in certain countries, 
traditionally, in New Zealand, it has been sporting achievements that have created 
identification with the New Zealand national identity and raised the countries national 
prestige, rather than accomplishments in the performing arts.  There are few, if any, 
instances of traditional performing arts where New Zealand has raised its international 
profile due to the existence of a particular activity.  However, the Sport and 
Recreation New Zealand budget for 2009/2010 to promote and encourage sport and 
recreation in New Zealand is NZ$22 million,30 which is only slightly higher than the 
funding provided to the Royal New Zealand Ballet and the New Zealand Symphony 
Orchestra combined.   
Conversely, while more of a cultural symbol than an arts institution, an important 
cultural reference point for Australia is the Sydney Opera House.  This organisation 
appears to be unable to break even, even with the support of the state, thereby perhaps 
justifying state support for its continued existence.  Thus, the national identity 
argument appears most relevant when assessed on a country specific case-by-case 
basis. 
Moving away from the more traditional arts, New Zealand and Australia have 
both recently benefited from the national prestige associated with a successful film 
industry.  The considerable positive economic benefits and externalities from the Lord 
of the Rings trilogy, filmed in New Zealand, are outlined later in this section.   
 
Calculating Economic Benefit 
One of the issues with tax incentives is their lack of transparency.  New Zealand 
is one of few OECD countries that does not produce a tax expenditure statement.  
Typically the production of a tax expenditure statement is to ensure transparency of 
policy and to facilitate debate and input into development of the tax system.  The 
explanation provided for this non-disclosure is that the levels of revenue foregone are 
small.  However, the impact of this non-disclosure is that it becomes difficult to 
analyse the effectiveness and potential contribution to the economy of the tax based 
incentives.  Moreover, this lack of visibility of state expenditure removes 
accountability for the funds invested.  At the present time in New Zealand, the 
primary performance measures for arts activities are outputs such as performances 
and audiences, rather than demonstration of economic benefit.  However, when tax 
                                                
30 Vote Sport and Recreation, Estimates of Appropriations 2009/10, B.5, p.315.   
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expenditures are detailed, such as in Australia, it is widely accepted that they are 
difficult to measure, and accordingly ‘it is virtually impossible to be definitive about 
the optimal magnitude of government subsidies and grants’ (Globerman 1987:30).   
 
Who decides? 
A criticism frequently attached to the provision of any tax incentive is the 
tendency to privilege one group above another.  In a democratic environment, direct 
taxpayer funded subsidies may be accused of lacking democratic transparency.  
Furthermore, to the extent that the state supports certain art forms and not others, 
leads to the paternalistic suggestion that the state can decide for the population what is 
good for it.  As captured by Feld (2008:276), ‘centralized government grant-making 
creates the risk that a small number of decision makers will determine the kind and 
quality of art worthy of support, based on their particular judgments and tastes’.  
By way of comparison, the provision of a tax deduction or a government 
matching co-contribution for a charitable donation, provides for individual preference 
to influence the organisations that receive state support.  However, the use of 
deductions does not resolve the issue.  Weil (1991:173) claims that ‘the bulk of giving 
to cultural organizations comes from a relatively small handful of affluent taxpayers’.  
When tax support is provided in the form of a tax deduction, Weil suggests that ‘this 
handful of taxpayers is in essence able to spend the public’s money without any of the 
administrative safeguards or democratic participation that would normally 
accompany such a public expenditure’.  This view is shared by Schuster (1987:45) 
who claims that tax deductions ‘may exacerbate the tastes of relatively wealthy 
donors who use the tax incentive to leverage and help finance large donations to 
certain charitable sectors’. In addition, Schuster (1986:321) claims ‘not only do tax 
incentives affect the relative cost of artistic goods and services, they also affect the 
relative mix of artistic activities that public and private arts institutions, artists, and 
entrepreneurs ultimately choose to provide’.  What is apparent is that the privileged 
arts that receive government funding are likely to be those provided to the public.   
 
Costs 
There are a number of financial issues associated with arts funding, particularly in 
New Zealand.  The process for allocation of funds to the arts in New Zealand is 
unclear, appearing to be based primarily on historical practice, with little evaluation 
and analysis over time in relation to its continued provision.     
Schuster (1986:354) suggests that the problems associated with appropriately 
targeting tax incentives, and the difficulty with assessing the cost of the tax incentive, 
are that these incentives may ‘prove to be particularly costly ways to support the 
arts’.  There are well established issues in measuring tax expenditures, both in terms 
of their cost and their effectiveness.  Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002:1501) suggest that 
there are four costs associated with the provision of tax incentives: 
(i) distortions between activities that receive incentives and those that do not; 
(ii) foregone revenue; 
(iii) administrative resources; and 
(iv) the social costs of rent-seeking activities associated with the abuse of tax 
incentives.   
All these points are relevant, and their existence supports an argument that state 
funding of any enterprise should require justification of social or economic benefit.  
As observed by Globerman (1987:11): 
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conceptually, the cost to the public treasury is the foregone tax revenue 
associated with the tax write-off … appropriately discounted to a present 
value.  In fact the more relevant notion of social costs to employ when 
evaluating any public policy is the value of the resources used to produce 
the output in question, presuming the resource would not have otherwise 
been unemployed.   
This conception of the opportunity cost associated with arts funding is important, 
and one that is not frequently seen in the literature.  In particular, opportunity cost 
applied to industries that have demonstrated an ability to contribute to economic 
growth would appear to be a valid, if perhaps contentious, measure.   
When compared with expenditure on the arts in Australia, and in particular on the 
Australian film industry, New Zealand’s tax incentives are meagre.  There is an 
awareness of the importance of remaining internationally competitive in the film 
industry, as demonstrated in the Ministry of Economic Development Cabinet Paper in 
2007, which outlines changes to the Large Budget Screen Production Grant and 
observes that ‘the proliferation of production subsidies around the globe has been one 
of the most significant factors affecting the choice of production venues for a 
significant volume of production.  Therefore, in order to remain a preferred 
destination, New Zealand must ensure that our incentive is globally competitive’.31  
Despite this awareness, New Zealand does not provide incentives at a comparable 
level to many other OECD countries.   
 
 
Maximising Economic Benefit 
While the possibility for creative enterprises to create economic development is 
disputed by some,32 generally it is agreed that the arts can contribute positively to 
economic growth.  The potential for export and economic growth, job creation, and 
development of an increasingly skilled population is significant.33  However, the issue 
is in demonstrating that they can make a greater contribution than the opportunity cost 
foregone from the funding.    
The argument that a strong arts community can assist in job creation and other 
economic benefits is not without merit.  However, this argument may be extended to 
almost every industry.  The issue is in deciding which of the arts are more equal than 
others when funding decisions are made.  There may be the potential for the arts 
sector to be, or become, a high-growth market but, nonetheless, it would seem prudent 
to fund those activities that are most likely to produce this outcome.   
There are some who consider that New Zealand is performing well in its support 
of the arts, for example, Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright (2008:20) suggest that New 
Zealand has ‘a sophisticated menu of policy tools and regulations promoting 
production’ in creative industries, and ‘in these countries, the debate has moved on 
from whether the sector is a valuable one or not, to which policy tools are best 
adapted to participating in it or which are most acceptable given international policy 
commitments’.  Furthermore, Florida (2002:xxiv) suggests that New Zealand will be 
among a number of smaller countries ‘that have built dynamic creative climates and 
                                                
31 Office of the Minister for Economic Development, Cabinet Policy Committee Business Committee, 
Large Budget Screen Production Grant Review of Bundling, Cabinet Paper, July 2007.   
32  For example, Bille Hansen (1995) suggests that the economic effects of the arts have been 
exaggerated, as analysis has looked at total consumption, rather than isolating new consumption as a 
result of the arts.   
33 The World Bank suggests that creative industries can add up to seven per cent to GDP, with 
associated growth rates of 10 – 20 per cent per annum (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008:6).   
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are turning out creative products ranking from Nokia cell phones to the Lord of the 
Rings movies’.  However, it is suggested that New Zealand has not capitalised on the 
success of the Lord of the Rings films and subsequently lost an opportunity to benefit 
from further economic benefit from expansion of this niche industry.  By way of 
comparison, in 2009 Australia launched an A$17 million Creative Industries 
Innovation Centre, to provide emerging creative organisations with access to business 
advisory and development networks.34   
The underlying premise of this paper is the point made by Richard Florida:  ‘the 
key to economic growth lies not just in the ability to attract the creative class, but to 
translate that underlying advantage into creative economic outcomes in the form of 
new ideas, new high-tech businesses and regional growth’ (2002:2).  There are 
numerous opportunities to provide arts funding.  New Zealand, as a small country, 
needs to be particularly strategic about the provision of funding for enterprises that 
may, or may not, contribute to economic growth.   
New Zealand is frequently ranked among the world’s best places to live, 35  
thereby fulfilling one of Florida’s (2002, 2005) primary requirements to attract a 
‘creative class’.  In 2002, the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research produced 
a report on the economic impacts of the Lord of the Rings (New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research 2002).  While the film trilogy was not yet complete at the time of 
the report, it provides some indication of the transitory and lasting benefits gained 
from its New Zealand production.  The primary benefits are outlined below: 
                                                
? Financial benefits of New Zealand expenditure, including NZ$353 million 
expenditure (to March 2002), including labour costs of $188 million; 
? Peak period employment of around 1,500 people per week; 
? The use of around 5,000 vendors, primarily in New Zealand; 
? Broadening of production skill base and capacity; 
? Enhancing New Zealand’s creative reputation, talent development and 
production capacity; and 
? Lifting industry capability and ability to new levels. 
 The differences in approaches between funding the arts and encouraging business 
in the arts are vast.  State provided funding for the arts implies that it should be both 
transparent and accountable: discretionary taxpayer funded support should come with 
strings attached.  It is insufficient to consider certain forms of arts as necessary for 
society, particularly when they are not available to all for consumption.  As noted by 
Bille Hansen (1995:310), ‘it is not enough to show that the arts generate income, 
employment and tax revenues, for all economic activity does that.  Of course, the arts 
are not the only sector that contributes directly and indirectly to value growth and 
employment in society’.   As a minimum requirement, tax based funding should come 
with a requirement to demonstrate a contribution to economic development.   
  
Externalities 
One of the potential greatest outcomes from expenditure on the arts, is the 
potential for spill over benefits.  The Lord of the Rings production in New Zealand 
provided significant externalities for the country.  Those estimated by the New 
Zealand Institute of Economic Research (2002) include: 
34  Australian Government. Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts. 
http://www.arts.gov.au. 
35 For example, in BusinessWeek’s ranking of the best cities in the world to live (using quality of life 
measures), Auckland is ranked at 4th equal (with Vancouver) and Wellington is 12th, 
http://www.businessweek.com.  
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? Increased international profile of the New Zealand film industry; 
? Increased skill base in the New Zealand screen production industry; 
? Establishing a foundation for New Zealand creative entrepreneurship, 
centred on the film industry; 
? Broadening film infrastructure; 
? Enhancing Brand New Zealand; and 
? The creation of spin off industries, such as merchandising.36   
When these benefits are compared to those of the more traditional art forms, such 
as ballet and the symphony orchestra in New Zealand, these traditional arts activities 
are not likely to create externalities to the same extent.   
 
Merit Good Argument 
Following the economic argument of market failure and the potential demise of 
some areas of art, the associated question becomes whether this is likely to have a 
significant impact on society.  It is well established (e.g. Globerman 1987:40) that the 
traditional arts are frequented to a greater extent by those with greater education and 
higher incomes, thus it may not be unreasonable to suggest that the majority of the 
population would not suffer a declining quality of life if art forms such as the ballet or 
symphony orchestra were no longer state funded.   
The question is succinctly captured by Peacock (2006:1124), who claims ‘the 
interesting question is why such support, coupled with regulatory measures to control 
the provision and sale of historical artefacts, is found in the arts, whereas in other 
forms of productive activity, such support is increasingly reduced, as instanced in 
privatisation measures’. This can be seen in New Zealand, with the removal of tax 
credits for research and development in November 2008.  However, funding for 
traditional arts has either remained the same or, in some instances, increased.  
Peacock (2006) suggests that there is scepticism by governments about the ability of 
consumers to appropriately value the choice of arts that they wish to enjoy, thereby 
resulting in producer interest groups with the ability to influence the policy approach 
in this regard.  However, there is an equally compelling argument that if these arts 
institutions were ‘good enough’ then they would not need state funding as they would 
attract sufficient private audiences to permit self-funding.    
 
Summary 
Perhaps the two primary potential benefits from arts organisations are the 
potential for improved national identity and economic benefit.  Elements of the ‘high 
arts’ in New Zealand, such as the ballet and national orchestra are unlikely to generate 
considerable economic activity or add to New Zealand’s national identity.  These 
national arts in New Zealand are unable to compete with the standards of their more 
well-known counterparts in larger countries (e.g. the Royal Ballet or the Royal Opera 
House) and thus are unlikely to attract international audiences to participate in their 
activity.  Conversely, New Zealand cultural activities, such as Te Papa Tongarewa, 
the national museum, have a demonstrated ability to attract a wider audience.37  
                                                
36 It is acknowledged that the report highlighted some negative externalities from the production of the 
Lord of the Rings in New Zealand, including increased labour costs in some industries, the potential for 
adverse environmental effects in some filming locations, and increased house prices in the Wellington 
suburbs where much of the work was undertaken.  However, these effects are mostly short-term in 
nature (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002:29).   
37 For example, an exhibition held at Te Papa Tongarewa (the New Zealand national museum) in 
Wellington in early 2009 (Monet and the Impressionists) was estimated to bring NZ$34.5 million in 
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The Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2004) Review of Government Screen 
Funding Arrangements Discussion Paper in 2004 emphasises that government support 
should be based on ‘the screen sector’s ability to contribute to the government’s 
broad cultural and economic objectives; [and] the identification of gaps in the sector 
where government intervention is appropriate and effective and will be 
complementary to activities in the private sector’. While there appeared to be an 
attempt to take advantage of the immediate post-Lord of the Rings positive impact on 
the New Zealand film industry (e.g. the large budget productions such as the 
Chronicles of Narnia and the Hercules mini-series filming in New Zealand38), this 
position appears to have been ineffectively capitalised, with few producers choosing 
New Zealand as a location in more recent times.   
 
CONCLUSION 
One’s view on the provision of tax incentives is likely to be influenced as much 
by one’s perspective of the place of the arts in society, as much as by economic 
analysis.  However, where economic analysis may assist is the allocation of scarce 
resources.  Thirty years ago, Throsby and Withers (1979:204) suggested that ‘to bring 
notions of efficiency to bear on arts policy may seem irrelevant or vulgar’.  However, 
in a highly competitive, global marketplace, the need for all publicly funded 
organisations to be held accountable for the use of state funds, and provide a 
demonstrated return on investment, appears defensible.   
There is an argument to be made that New Zealand needs to move away from 
funding the arts, into funding generation of businesses in the arts.  As a small country, 
New Zealand has to be strategic in all expenditure.  Appropriate targeting of specific, 
highly skilled endeavours (such as digital effects in films) and providing incentives to 
attract these businesses to New Zealand, appears to be more likely to generate a 
positive return than funding traditional arts forms that are less likely to do so.  
Moreover, the spill over benefits that occur from more modern arts far exceed those 
produced by traditional art forms.  By positioning ‘New Zealand Inc’ as a specialised 
niche economy, New Zealand may benefit from industry based economic growth, 
rather than arbitrary and isolated funding of selected projects.   
It may be that there is a case for increased state funding to ‘new’ art forms, such 
as digital products that are likely to expand the skill base and grow the economy.  
However, under the current funding arrangements, the costs and likely benefits of 
such changes are difficult to assess.  There is no question that more research is 
warranted in this area, with more appropriately targeted spending likely to provide 
wider societal and economic benefit.    
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